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Abstract: I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or 
not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them 
or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an 
argument of Angela Smith’s; the same features that she says make us morally 
responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our 
concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can be: (a) conceptually and rationally 
connected to our evaluative judgments, (b) in principle subject to rational revision 
(reasons-responsive), and (c) the basis for actual and potential moral assessments of 
people that we have good reasons to endorse. Thus, we are open to moral appraisal 
on the basis of having and using (or not using) our concepts we when they reflect our 
evaluative judgments, though even then it is not always appropriate to praise or blame 
us on that basis.  
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1. Introduction 
Concepts are neither true nor false, but they can be evaluated: do we have 
reason to track the distinction drawn by the concept? Should we have this or 
that concept in our repertoire at all? If so, how … should [we] construe it? What 
alternative concepts might we deploy instead? (Haslanger, 2014: 28) 
 
I aim to argue that sometimes we are morally responsible for having and using (or not 
using) our concepts in the ways that we do. To do so, I extend one of Angela Smith’s 
(2005) arguments for her rational relations view of moral responsibility, according to 
which we are morally responsible for both our actions and our attitudes insofar as and 
because they reflect our evaluative judgments (see also Smith 2004, 2007, 2008, 2012 
and 2015). Like actions, she says, attitudes can be and often are appropriately 
connected to mental activity to ground moral assessment. This is not, yet, to say 
anything about what moral assessments are appropriate in any situation. On Smith’s 
view, being morally responsible for something is being open to moral appraisal on the 
basis of it, so being morally responsible for something does not settle the question of 
whether one merits a positive, negative, or neutral appraisal because of it, much less 
whether anyone should express praise or blame on that basis.  
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 Similarly, I argue that we are sometimes open to moral appraisal on the basis of 
our having and using (or not using) concepts in the ways that we do, insofar as and 
because our doing so reflects our evaluative judgments. The ‘insofar as’ is crucial. To 
the extent that having and using (or not using) a concept does not reflect one’s 
evaluative judgments, one is not morally responsible for it. We are morally responsible 
for concepts when and only when (and because and to the extent that) they reflect our 
evaluative judgments. This leaves it open whether (and if so, when and to what extent) 
we are blameworthy or praiseworthy (or should be blamed or praised) for our concept 
possession and usage. 
To support my conclusion, I argue that our concepts are sometimes 
conceptually and rationally connected to our evaluative judgments (§ 4.1), that 
concepts are in principle subject to rational revision (§ 4.2), and that concept 
possession and usage are the basis for some actual and potential moral assessments of 
people that we have good reasons to endorse (§ 4.3). First, however, I briefly explain 
and defend Smith’s theory (§ 2) and clarify my assumptions about what concepts are 
(§ 3). After the main arguments, I discuss which concepts are more likely to reflect our 
evaluative judgments (§ 5) and why we can be morally responsible, not just for using 
concepts, but also for having them (§ 6). I conclude by responding to two objections 
(§§ 7–8). 
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Note that in what follows, I sometimes use ‘moral responsibility for concepts’ as 
shorthand for the more cumbersome ‘moral responsibility for having and using (or not 
using) some of our concepts in the ways that we do’. This parallels how we might say 
‘responsibility for attitudes and actions’ when we mean ‘responsibility for having certain 
attitudes and doing certain actions’.  
 
2. Moral Responsibility  
My claim that we are morally responsible for concepts may strike many people as 
outrageous, since many people believe that (a) we cannot be morally responsible for 
things we do not directly, voluntarily control and (b) we (as individuals) cannot directly, 
voluntarily control which concepts we have or how we use them.1  
Regarding (b), I agree that which concepts one has, their exact content, and 
when and how one uses them are not, in general, under one’s full, direct, or voluntary 
control. This is because (i) concepts are acquired in social contexts that no individual 
can fully control (see Fricker 2007), (ii) concepts are often acquired, revised, and used 
unintentionally,2 and (iii) the exact content of one’s concepts is often opaque even to 
oneself (which is why conceptual analysis requires effort).  
To expand on the support for (b), consider an example. As a child, I was taught 
that there exists a god of a Christian sort. I did not seek out that concept, I could not 
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help but form it in my circumstances, and its content was not wholly up to me. While, 
for reasons not entirely under my direct, voluntary control, I no longer believe that 
deity exists, the concept is still in my repertoire. More importantly for present 
purposes, I sometimes find myself using it in ways that conflict with my considered 
judgments. For example, occasionally, upon realizing that I have wronged someone, 
the thought ‘God is going to punish me’ pops into my head. When aware of such 
thoughts, I think they involve mistaken concept usage, because my considered 
judgments about appropriate application of the concept GOD have changed. Yet I still 
sometimes use the concept in that way, since old habits die hard. So, (iv) concept 
usage is not always under our full, direct, voluntary control, as shown by cases when it 
conflicts with our considered judgments. Furthermore, insofar as we cannot believe (or 
cease believing) at will,3 our concept usage is no more under our full, direct, voluntary 
control when our judgments are correct and consistent than when they are not.4 Thus 
the case for (b) is strong. 
As for (a), many people believe that only one’s voluntary choice or exercise of 
control makes one morally responsible for something. That belief underlies many 
people’s thinking about common practices, like saying that someone is not morally 
responsible for something because she did not mean to do it, did not know what he 
was doing, had no choice about it, or could not control it.5  Smith calls these 
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volitionalist views of moral responsibility, since they say that exercising the will is a 
precondition for being morally responsible.6 
However, (a) is controversial. Some people argue that we can be morally 
responsible for things we do not directly, voluntarily control; of their views, I favor 
Smith’s rational relations view.7 As she says, ‘what makes an attitude “ours” in the 
sense relevant to questions of responsibility and moral assessment is not that we have 
voluntarily chosen it or that we have voluntary control over it, but that it reflects our 
own evaluative judgments’ (2005: 238). One of her supporting arguments involves an 
investigation of cases designed to show not only that (a) it is common practice to 
assess people on the basis of attitudes that are not under their direct, conscious, or 
voluntary control, but also, more crucially, (b) we have good reasons to endorse those 
assessment practices, (c) a rationalist, rather than volitionalist, account of moral 
responsibility provides a more compelling rationale for those practices, and thus (d) 
what makes one morally responsible for an attitude is its reflecting one’s evaluative 
judgments, not its being under one’s direct or voluntary control.8  
For instance, Smith says, we sometimes consider people (including ourselves) 
responsible, and maybe even blameworthy, for things like forgetting a friend’s 
birthday, even though forgetting is not under people’s direct or voluntary control 
(2005: 236). We do so insofar as and because we think (often for good reasons) that 
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forgetting reflects something problematic about the forgetful person’s evaluative 
judgments (not just failure to take relevant measures to remember earlier); in such 
cases, forgetting often reflects judgments about the friend’s value and importance. 
(However, insofar as forgetting does not reflect one’s evaluative judgments, as, for 
instance, it might not if one has a serious memory disorder, one would not be morally 
responsible for it.) Smith concludes that we can appropriately be held responsible not 
just for our actions, but also our attitudes, since they can reflect our evaluative 
judgments (our mental activity) even when they are not under our direct or voluntary 
control. Moreover, our being morally responsible for our attitudes means that it is 
appropriate to ask us to defend or justify them, just as with our actions. A friend might 
reasonably ask me why I forgot her birthday, wanting more than mere explanation; she 
might want me to justify myself, which I might or might not be able to do.  
Smith’s view is not without challengers. Some have objected that it is 
problematically narrow, thin, or incomplete.9 David Shoemaker (2011) thinks there are 
three distinct senses of moral responsibility; he appeals to cases of irrationality, non-
rational emotional commitment, and psychopathy to argue that Smith captures only a 
subset of all moral responsibility, leaving out the kinds found in those cases. 
While more substantive responses to such an objection are available (see Smith 
2012 and Hubbs 2013), for present purposes, note that if responsibility in Smith’s 
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sense is narrower, thinner, or less comprehensive than what others mean by ‘moral 
responsibility’, it is less controversial to claim that we are morally responsible, in that 
sense, for concepts. I do not think that Smith’s account is problematic in those ways, 
but regardless, it is worth showing why we are morally responsible for concepts, even if 
only in a restricted sense, since doing so highlights a neglected feature of the moral 
landscape and the argument has implications that are worth exploring. 
Nevertheless, others might object to Smith’s view because it seems to entail that 
we are morally responsible even for attitudes that are implanted in us by mad 
scientists, hypnotists, deities, or bizarre accidents, contra common intuitions. For if 
someone or something were to implant an attitude in me, I would seem not to be 
morally responsible for it; because of its causal origin, many would say it is not mine in 
the right sense. 
However, even if we are happy to use such far-fetched cases to test theories of 
moral responsibility (and I am somewhat skeptical about that methodology), we can 
respond to this worry (see Smith 2005: 261-262 and 2008: 389). For if the implanted 
attitude is unconnected to my evaluative judgments (say, immediately after 
implantation of a single attitude), then I am not responsible for it. If it does reflect my 
evaluative judgments (say, after I have made evaluative judgments that integrate it with 
my other attitudes), I would be morally responsible for it. In cases of wholesale 
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attitude implantation, questions about continuity of personal identity become more 
pressing; I doubt whether I would be there, which precludes my being responsible. 
While there is certainly more to say to defend Smith, moving forward I assume 
that she is at least largely correct about the criteria for moral responsibility. So, do the 
same features that make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us 
morally responsible for some of our concepts? I think so. As Smith says, we are morally 
responsible for attitudes insofar as and because they are (a) conceptually and rationally 
connected to evaluative judgments, (b) in principle subject to rational revision, and (c) 
the basis for some actual and potential moral assessments of people that we 
sometimes have good reasons to endorse. I argue that the same is true of concepts. 
 
3. Concepts 
But what are concepts? Starting functionally, concepts are cognitive resources, and as 
Sally Haslanger says, frameworks of concepts are tools (2012: 23). Our conceptual 
repertoires allow us to mentally unite tokens and differentiate types, thereby enabling 
us to categorize and understand things.10 
Whether concepts are mental representations (à la Fodor (1975)), abstract 
objects (à la Frege (see Zalta 2001)), or even abilities (à la Kenny (2010)), what matters 
most for my purposes is that concepts are things that we, in common parlance, 
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possess and use. My concern is with the mental activities that involve or result in 
persons standing in relations to concepts, specifically the relations denoted by ‘possess 
a concept’ and ‘use a concept’. In fact, I see concept possession and usage as 
inextricably linked, which informs my thinking that we are morally responsible for both 
(a) possessing concepts and also (b) whether, when, and how we use (or do not use) 
them. I say more about why we are responsible for both possessing and using (or not 
using) concepts in § 6, but I follow Siebel (2004) in thinking that to have a concept is to 
be able to think about what it is a concept of (which is not to say that one’s conception 
is adequate). 
I do not think that ontological debates about exactly what concepts are need to 
be settled for us to say that the relations of possession and usage can link people to 
concepts in ways that render the former responsible for the latter. Just as when a 
person has a propositional attitude, they stand in a relation to a proposition and can 
thereby be responsible for doing so, when a person possesses or uses a concept, they 
stand in a relation to it and can thereby be responsible for that. Philosophers who 
argue that we are morally responsible for our propositional attitudes generally remain 
agnostic about the exact nature of propositions, and I would prefer to remain similarly 
agnostic about what a concept is. 
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However, I cannot be completely agnostic about that here, for two reasons: one 
having to do with the impossibility of using completely neutral language and one 
having to do with my focus on individual moral responsibility. Regarding the first, 
whatever verbs I choose to describe our relations to concepts will inevitably fit better 
with some views about concepts’ ontological status than others, so complete 
agnosticism is not an option. For example, ‘grasping concepts’ might seem to imply 
acceptance of the abstract object view of concepts, whereas ‘forming concepts’ and 
‘revising concepts’ might seem to imply acceptance of the mental representation view, 
and ‘mastering concepts’ might seem to imply acceptance of the ability view. 
So, I advance my argument under the assumption that concepts are mental 
representations rather than abstract objects or abilities. I do so because, in addition to 
the substantial (though not necessarily overwhelming) independent reasons to favor 
the psychological view that concepts are representations (see Margolis and Laurence 
2007 and Sutton 2004), doing so fits best with both (a) Smith’s focus on individual 
moral responsibility and (b) common expressions that portray concepts as things that 
individuals can possess and use. I leave it for another occasion to argue for the same 
conclusion on the assumption that concepts are abstract objects; as I envision it, that 
involves focusing on collective moral responsibility. For now, I restrict myself to 
considering how concepts, understood as mental representations, are sometimes 
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similar enough to attitudes to reflect our evaluative judgments and thus to render us 
morally responsible for them. 
 
4. Moral Responsibility for Concepts 
4.1. Conceptual and rational connections to evaluative judgments 
The first relevant similarity between concepts and attitudes is that they are both 
conceptually and rationally connected to evaluative judgments. As Smith writes:  
Attitudes such as contempt, jealousy, and regret seem to be partially constituted 
by certain kinds of evaluative judgments or appraisals. … There seems to be a 
conceptual connection between having these attitudes and making, or being 
disposed to make, certain kinds of judgments. (2005: 250) 
For example, having the attitude of regret seems to be conceptually connected to 
being disposed to judge that something bad happened. 
Turning from attitudes to concepts, the mere possession of a concept is similarly 
conceptually connected to making or being disposed to make certain judgments. For 
instance, to have the concept of red, one must be able to think about redness and 
disposed to judge that red is a color, is different from green, and so on; without such 
dispositions, one lacks RED. Similarly, having UNICORN just is (in part) being disposed 
to judge that a horse with one horn is (or would be) a unicorn.  
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Concepts come in sets, conceptual repertoires, which have complex internal 
structures of interconnections. For instance, TRIANGLE is necessarily related to THREE, 
ANGLE, and SHAPE, and ACTION is necessarily related to AGENT. 11  Other 
connections are contingent; for instance, in my conceptual repertoire, NECTARINE 
(which represents my favorite fruit) and DELICIOUS are connected, but might not have 
been.  
One might notice that the judgments that I said are conceptually connected to 
the concepts RED and UNICORN are not evaluative judgments, and Smith’s argument 
requires linking attitudes to specifically evaluative judgments. One might think that the 
attitudes that she mentions necessarily have normative content, whereas the concepts I 
mentioned do not, and thus that I have a problem. 
However, I have a two-part response. First, fair enough: I chose RED and 
UNICORN because they are fairly simple and clear examples. However, those 
examples do not rule out the existence of other concepts, like JUSTICE, which have 
normative content and which are linked conceptually (and, as I explain shortly, 
rationally) to evaluative judgments. Furthermore, and more importantly, in part 
because concepts are formed in social contexts, their content is rarely, if ever, fully 
transparent. 12  Since the unrecognized baggage that our concepts carry is often 
normative, sometimes even familiar concepts that seem to lack normative content 
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are conceptually or rationally connected to evaluative judgments. For instance, many 
people think WHEELCHAIR BOUND is purely descriptive and innocuous, but since it 
falsely implies that all people who use wheelchairs lack freedom and agency (unlike, 
say, PERSON WHO USES A WHEELCHAIR or WHEELCHAIR USER), it is disrespectful 
and misleading.13 
With that in mind, let us shift from conceptual connections to rational 
connections. As Smith says: 
If we value something and judge it to be worth promoting, protecting, or 
honoring in some way, this should (rationally) have an influence on our 
unreflective patterns of thought and feeling. We commonly infer from these 
unreflective patterns, or from their absence, what a person really cares about 
and judges to be important. (2005: 247) 
Similarly, our evaluative judgments about things’ worth should (rationally) influence 
which concepts we do or do not use in thinking about those things, and the specific 
ways in which we use those concepts when we do. For patterns of thought are partially 
constituted by patterns of concept usage; if thought patterns should, rationally, be 
influenced by evaluative judgments, then concept usage patterns also should be. For 
example, if I judge that pacifism is virtuous, then I should, rationally, tend to use 
concepts like BRAVE and REASONABLE rather than COWARD or MISGUIDED when 
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thinking about pacifists. I could still be rational in thinking of a particular pacifist as 
being misguided or cowardly, or in thinking, ‘Many others see pacifists as misguided 
cowards’, but the point is that our evaluative judgments and what we see as reasons 
should (in a rational sense) impact which concepts we use, and how we use them. 
Of course, we are not always fully rational, as Smith emphasizes: 
The view that I am putting forward takes as its starting point the idea that some 
of our mental states are linked to particular judgments in such a way that, if one 
sincerely holds a particular evaluative judgment, then the mental state in 
question should (or should not) occur. The “should” in question here is the 
should of rationality and, therefore, marks a normative ideal which our actual 
attitudes may not always meet. (2005: 253) 
I am suggesting that sometimes to have or use a concept is to be in a mental state that 
is, in key ways, similar to having an attitude for which we are morally responsible. For 
instance, INJUSTICE necessarily has normative content, and possessing it is 
conceptually connected to being disposed to judge that injustice is bad. Furthermore, 
there are rational connections between the concepts I have, the evaluative judgments I 
make, and the ways in which I do or do not use concepts. When I use some concept in 
my repertoire, it is because I have, consciously or not, made a judgment about when it 
is appropriate to use it. For example, there is a rational connection between my 
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possessing the concept INJUSTICE, my using it to categorize an act, and my evaluative 
judgment that I should not do that act. There is also a rational connection between my 
possessing the concept INJUSTICE, my evaluative judgment that another act is morally 
acceptable, and my refusal to apply INJUSTICE to that act. Moreover, if I judge that 
one of Antonin Scalia’s legal opinions is a blight on American jurisprudence, then that 
judgment is rationally connected to my using INJUSTICE to categorize that opinion, 
and you can appropriately ask me to defend my using INJUSTICE thus.14 So, as I clarify 
in the next section, there are rational standards that govern concept usage; insofar as 
my concept usage reflects and responds to the reasons they provide, and so meets 
those standards, my concept usage is rational. Thus, like the attitudes for which we are 
morally responsible, some of our concepts are conceptually and rationally connected 
to our evaluative judgments. 
 
4.2. Rational revision 
But the similarities do not end there; concepts are also in principle subject to rational 
revision, as attitudes are. As Smith writes, ‘In order for a creature to be responsible for 
an attitude, on the rational relations view, it must be the kind of state that is open, in 
principle, to revision or modification through that creature’s own processes of rational 
reflection’ (2005: 256).15 To see that attitudes are (somewhat) reasons-responsive, 
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consider regret again. If I feel regret, but then discover that no bad thing has actually 
occurred, my regret will likely dissolve. Alternatively, if I find that I was wrong about 
which bad thing occurred or how bad it was, the nature of my regret will likely be 
altered. 
Illustrations of the fact that some of one’s concepts are similarly (somewhat) 
reasons-responsive are numerous and varied. 16  For example, over time, without 
necessarily being aware of doing so or choosing to do so, many Americans have, using 
rational activity, revised their concept of membership in the Democratic and/or 
Republican parties. For the strengths of, challenges faced by, and members of political 
parties change constantly, and people’s concepts of said parties change in response: 
quickly or slowly, in ways that are obvious or recognizable only after careful reflection, 
if at all. So, some of our concepts, like those of specific political parties, change 
because reality changes, and because concepts are reasons-responsive. 
In contrast, sometimes our conceptual repertoires change, not because external 
reality changes, but because we gain access to information that, rationally speaking, 
forces us to conceptualize the same old reality in a new way. For instance, my formative 
circumstances led me, like many others, to form a biological concept of race. Races, as 
represented by that concept, are products of natural forces like, say, different kinds of 
rocks or birds. However, that biological concept has been superseded, in my mind, 
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with a social concept, which represents races as categories devised by people to rank 
groups of people on the basis of observed and imagined bodily features. My exposure 
to relevant scientific and historical information and philosophical arguments like 
Haslanger’s led to this adjustment in my conceptual repertoire, which happened 
gradually over time. So, my concept of race changed in response to being exposed to 
new reasons, as have the ways and contexts in which I use it.17 To use Haslanger’s 
terminology (2012: 375, 378, and 387-390), both my manifest and operative concepts 
of race have changed.18 Nevertheless, the biological and social reality that I think about 
when using RACE have not changed to a degree commensurate with the change in my 
concept. Other examples of this kind of reasons-responsiveness involve simply adding 
or subtracting details from our concepts in light of new information, as when it dawned 
on me that triangles do not just have three sides (as I learned in preschool), but also 
have three angles (hence the name!). Triangles themselves did not change, but my 
concept TRIANGLE sure did (though not as much as RACE).19 
Acquiring concepts is also a process that sometimes involves rational activity. 
Consider Miranda Fricker’s (2007: chapter 7) discussion of how the concept of sexual 
harassment and its name were added to our collective resources by women trying to 
understand and deal with their own experiences of it.20 They used their rational activity 
to discover that their experiences fit a pattern, named it, and thereby gave us a 
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powerful resource for combatting injustice. Thus, our rational activity enables us to 
acquire new concepts when our conceptual repertoires are inadequate for our 
purposes. 
These examples show that we can revise the content of our concepts, change 
the contexts and ways in which we use concepts, and acquire new concepts through 
various more or less direct, more or less intentional, more or less voluntary means, and 
that such changes involve rational activity. Many philosophers who do conceptual 
analysis are committed to some version of the claim that concepts are in principle open 
to rational revision, insofar as they undertake conceptual analysis with the goal of 
clarifying concepts by shedding the intuitions about them and uses of them that we 
have reasons to reject. So being presented with new evidence, changing 
circumstances, or even changing priorities can (and sometimes should) initiate a 
reasons-responsive process of revising our conceptual repertoires. Since concepts are 
in principle subject to rational revision, proponents of the rational relations view should 
see the having and using of a concept, just like the having of an attitude, as something 
for which one can be responsible. This makes it appropriate to ask people to justify 
their having and using (or not using) their concepts. 
To relate this to control and an earlier example, I cannot simply will myself to 
eliminate the concept of a Christian god from my repertoire, which, even if I could, 
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would be inadvisable given the society in which I live. Nor can I consistently use that 
concept in ways that cohere with my considered judgments by sheer act of will. 
Nevertheless, its connections to my other concepts, and the ways in which I do and do 
not use it, certainly reflect my evaluative judgments and my rational activity more 
generally. (For instance, the ways that I use GOD show that my judgments about 
appropriate uses of that concept are not wholly consistent.) So, I am morally 
responsible for that concept and can legitimately be asked to justify my having it and 
my usage of it, though saying this leaves it open whether I merit a morally positive, 
negative, or neutral assessment on that basis.21  
 
4.3. Everyday practices of moral assessment 
Smith’s arguments are meant to show that people often make moral assessments of 
people on the basis of their attitudes. By recognizing this and, more crucially, arguing 
that we have good reasons to endorse that common practice, she defends the claim 
that we are morally responsible for our attitudes.  
While I think that Smith is correct that people regularly assess themselves and 
others on the basis of their attitudes, this might seem to pose a challenge for me, since 
it seems vastly less common to morally assess people on the basis of their concepts. It 
is quite rare to even try to determine which concepts people possess, though quite 
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common to try to determine which attitudes people have. Why? There are serious 
obstacles to determining which concepts people (especially third parties) possess, but 
the same is true of attitudes. To explain why we rarely assess people on the basis of 
their concepts as opposed to their attitudes, the more salient points are that in 
everyday life, (a) people use folk psychology to explain and predict behavior, which 
involves appealing to beliefs, desires, and emotions, but usually not concepts, (b) most 
people simply do not think about concepts as such, though most do think about 
attitudes, and (c) when people do think about concepts, it seems common to assume 
(probably mistakenly) that most people have more or less the same core set of them, 
an assumption that seems less likely regarding people’s attitudes. 
Nevertheless, some of us do occasionally assess people for the concepts that 
they use (both for using them at all and, more importantly, for when and how they use 
them). 22  Some of us make moral assessments of people for using concepts with 
derogatory content to categorize people on the basis of race, sex, nationality, ability, 
etc.23 For example, many of us judge people to be callous, insensitive, cruel, culpably 
ignorant, or otherwise morally bad when they categorize people of Asian descent using 
ORIENTALS, trans women using SHE-MALES, impoverished people using TAKERS, and 
undocumented immigrants using ILLEGALS. But liberals are not alone in morally 
assessing people on the basis of their concept usage, as these examples might 
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imply. For instance, some conservatives judge people to be profane, offensive, 
culpably ignorant, or otherwise morally bad when they use MARRIED to categorize 
same sex couples or use FETUS but not PERSON to categorize unborn humans. Nor do 
people only make negative moral assessments of people’s concept usage. For 
instance, one might consider someone praiseworthy for using PERSON WHO NEEDS 
HELP instead of TRAFFIC IMPEDIMENT to categorize a motorist stranded in a left-turn 
lane. To praise or blame in these cases requires an (implicit) attribution of moral 
responsibility. 
Of course, people do not necessarily know when others possess particular 
concepts and use them in particular ways. However, sometimes when people think 
they know, they ask others to justify their doing so. More importantly, sometimes this is 
exactly what we should do. The point is not that many people regularly do make moral 
assessments of people on the basis of their concept possession and usage (though 
some do sometimes). The point is that this practice is sometimes justified. In various 
cases, people have good reasons to make such assessments, just as we often have 
good reasons to assess people on the basis of their attitudes and actions, whether or 
not we actually do.  
Let’s explore the justification for morally assessing people on the basis of their 
concept possession and usage by considering a more detailed example. I grew up in 
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Fairfield, Iowa, which is a small town with a university designed to promote the 
teachings of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, founder of the Transcendental Meditation 
movement. Some so-called ‘townies’, who were unaffiliated with the university, were 
hostile toward those who were, and referred to members of the university community 
as ‘roos’ (or ‘rus’), a derogatory term derived from ‘guru’, which means a person who is, 
at best, flaky and odd, and at worst, a dangerous, brainwashed moron. Knowing this, 
when I heard someone say something about ‘roos’, even when it seemed relatively 
innocuous and true (like ‘Roos eat lots of vegetables’), I found myself making a 
negative assessment of whoever was using ROO to structure their thinking.  
For I (and they) knew that ROO had more in common with FOOL than with RED. 
It originated in stereotypes that were morally problematic and, generally, epistemically 
unjustified as well. It was born of fear and dislike, if not hatred, which produced a (likely 
unconscious) felt need to divide people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ and denigrate ‘them’. For 
many people, having disparaging attitudes was part and parcel of using ROO to 
categorize people, and vice versa (though I discuss a possible exception shortly). For 
certain attitudes can only be held if one has certain concepts, and the resources in 
one’s conceptual repertoire impact the range of attitudes that one can (and is likely to) 
have. 
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Someone might say that the only things of moral significance in this example are 
derogatory attitudes and the actions that express them, and that I do not need to talk 
about concepts to capture what people are morally responsible (and potentially 
blameworthy) for in such cases. I can see why they might suggest that; it would 
certainly seem to make for a simpler and less revisionary view. 
However, I do not think that it is just the attitudes and actions that form the basis 
of moral assessment in at least some such cases (nor do I think it should be). For I reject 
the underlying assumption that having an attitude is independent of having and using 
the concepts that figure in it. These are interdependent phenomena; having an attitude 
is a matter of using some of the concepts one possesses together in a certain way, and 
having a concept is being able or disposed to use it in thinking (in some circumstances) 
(see Davis 2005a and Siebel 2004).  
Even if possessing and using concepts is not partially constitutive of having 
attitudes, possessing and using certain concepts is a necessary precondition for having 
certain attitudes. It is impossible to have attitudes if one lacks or does not use the 
concepts that figure in them. 24  So we would fail to account for some of the 
complexities of the moral landscape if we said that we are only morally responsible for 
our actions and attitudes, but not for the concepts that we possess and use in forming 
those attitudes. It would be like saying that one is morally responsible for shooting 
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someone without being responsible for having the gun that one used to do so.25 For 
concepts are the necessary cognitive resources that make thinking about things 
possible, and without them, we would not think as we do.  
But it is not merely using a concept that renders one morally responsible for it. 
Having a concept but refusing to use it can also reflect one’s evaluative judgments (see 
McCullagh 2011). Specifically, it can reflect the fact that one, consciously or 
unconsciously, thinks there is good reason not to use it. So not using a concept that 
one has does not entail a lack of responsibility for it. It can still be attributable to the 
person; it can still be theirs in a way that renders it appropriate to ask them to justify 
their not using it. But the appropriateness of asking for such a defense entails nothing 
about whether they will be able to provide a good one, and thus entails nothing about 
whether they are blameworthy for that concept. 
Furthermore, even if having and using concepts were fully separable from 
having the attitudes in which they figure, sometimes the concepts, not the attitudes, 
are the root of our problems. For sometimes, having and using a concept (in a certain 
way) enables problematic attitudes to play a more substantial role in one’s patterns of 
thought, more strongly influence one’s behavior, and be propagated to others.26 For 
example, imagine a child who has heard expressions of derogatory attitudes about 
people who meditate, but lacks the concept ROO. When the child acquires ROO, 
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derogatory stereotypes about people who meditate become more salient; it becomes 
easier for that child to think derogatory thoughts about them, because ROO represents 
all TM practitioners as sharing some bad essence. It functions as cognitive shorthand 
for all that is ‘wrong’ with ‘those people’. Moreover, when people start using ROO to 
mentally categorize people, that significantly increases the likelihood of their 
describing and treating people as ‘roos’ (that is, as inferior). That overt behavior then 
impacts the conceptual repertoires, attitudes, and behavior of others who witness it, 
including children who do not intend to disparage anyone, but who are too young to 
think critically about the significance of categorizing people as ‘roos’. 
More specifically, if one structures one’s thoughts using ROO rather than 
PERSON WHO MEDITATES (or just PERSON), one is more likely to think, say, and do 
things that produce or reinforce the belief (in oneself and others) that the people in 
question are quintessentially followers, not people who exercise agency by choosing to 
meditate.27 Simply put, using a concept that implicitly denies (or affirms) people’s 
agency is bound to impact one’s judgment, behavior, and the messages one 
communicates to others regarding them. In such cases, the possession and usage of 
the concept should be a, if not the, primary basis for assessment, at least when it 
comes to adults whose concept possession and usage reflect their evaluative 
judgments. So, to be clear, my negative assessments of some people who use the 
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term ‘roo’ are partly based on their possession and use of ROO, not just their attitudes, 
speech, or other behavior.28 
My focus on the ROO example is not meant to imply that only derogatory 
concepts applied to moral agents are relevant to moral responsibility and assessment. 
For example, environmentalists sometimes challenge people who, for Biblical reasons, 
use DOMINION to think about humans’ relation to non-human natural entities. 
Similarly, one might criticize the use of CURRY to lump together all spiced, sauced 
dishes from the Indian subcontinent, given that the practice originated with British 
colonialists, not within the cultures that created said dishes, where people know them 
by more specific names and types. Even if we do not go so far as to criticize in such 
cases, we can appropriately ask people to justify their using those concepts to mediate 
their engagement with the world and consider how using them in those ways can be 
harmful (by, for instance, contributing to oppression, cultural appropriation or erasure, 
silencing, marginalization, etc.). The justification we would want in some cases would 
not be purely epistemic, but moral as well (or instead). Moreover, if (for good reasons) 
we refrain from using CURRY or DOMINION in those ways, we can still be morally 
responsible for having and not using those concepts, because that refraining can 
reflect our evaluative judgments; they just happen to be judgments that make us more 
likely to be praiseworthy than blameworthy. 
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To summarize, I have argued that concepts can share three key features with 
attitudes. First, they can be conceptually and rationally connected to evaluative 
judgments. Second, they are in principle subject to rational revision. Third, people 
sometimes make moral assessments of people on the basis of the concepts they have 
and use (or do not use), and more importantly, upon reflection, we have good reasons 
to endorse that practice. Since those three features are those in virtue of which we can 
be morally responsible for something, the same features that can make us morally 
responsible for our actions and attitudes can also make us morally responsible for our 
concepts. That responsibility encompasses being responsible for having or not having 
concepts,29 and for using or not using them in specific ways. However, to claim that 
someone is morally responsible for their concepts is not yet to make any claim about 
whether they are blameworthy, praiseworthy, or neither on that basis, nor about 
whether or how anyone should blame or praise them. 
My view both is and is not a significant departure from existing rationalist views 
about moral responsibility. On the one hand, to any rationalist who already accepts 
that we can be responsible for mental and physical activities, my conclusion is not so 
outrageous after all. Using a concept is one of the mental activities characteristic of a 
rational agent, and having a concept, if not itself a mental activity, at least presupposes 
mental activity. 30  So my view is true to the widely shared belief that moral 
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responsibility depends on activity, which rationalists and volitionalists agree on (despite 
disagreeing about the kind of activity that matters or which mental states we are active 
with respect to).31  
On the other hand, my view adds a whole new category of mental activity for 
which we can be morally responsible. You might think that rationalists gain nothing 
from this, since (a) they already endorse moral responsibility for attitudes and (b) having 
and using concepts is nothing over and above having attitudes. However, by saying 
that we can also be morally responsible for the mental activities involved in having and 
using concepts, one (a) accepts a previously unrecognized implication of an existing 
rationalist view, and (b) opens the possibility of more fine-grained moral assessment. 
Recognizing our moral responsibility for concepts and attitudes allows us to target our 
assessment (and praise or blame) to the most crucial aspects of our agential activity in 
varying cases. Deciding whether or not someone is morally responsible in such cases is 
the first step toward deciding what, if any, praise or blame they merit. 
 
5. Which Concepts Are Most Likely to Reflect Our Evaluative Judgments? 
I have argued that we are sometimes morally responsible (though not necessarily 
praiseworthy or blameworthy) for having and using (or not using) some of our concepts: 
specifically, that we are morally responsible for our concepts when they reflect our 
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evaluative judgments. But which concepts are most likely to do so? Those seem to 
merit special moral scrutiny. Due to space limitations, I can only start developing an 
answer and mention some difficulties that must be faced in improving on it. 
 There are at least four options for how to approach the question. We might say 
that which concepts are most likely to reflect our evaluative judgments depends on (a) 
how the concepts were acquired, (b) how they are used, (c) their content or semantic 
features, or (d) their structure or syntactic features.  
 My first impulse was to look for a feature common to the examples in § 4, which 
initially led me to favor approach (c) and say that moral and social concepts (concepts 
of social groups, practices, etc.) are most likely to reflect our evaluative judgments. For 
those seemed most likely to meet the three conditions discussed in sections § 4.1-3. 
Mathematical, logical, and natural kind concepts seemed least likely to fulfill those 
conditions and thus least likely to reflect our evaluative judgments. 
 However, that picture is significantly complicated by at least three difficulties. 
First, we sometimes mistake concepts with moral and/or social content for natural kind 
concepts. The previously mentioned RACE example is one such case, but philosophers 
have uncovered many examples of concepts of supposedly natural, essential, and 
unchanging things are actually concepts of things that are contingent, changing, and 
socially constructed (in one sense or another). I expect us to find more. So we need 
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to be humble about our ability to correctly categorize concepts, which makes me 
cautious about inferring that being morally responsible for concepts is rare. 
 Second, concepts are used in sets, making it difficult to isolate which evaluative 
judgments are reflected by the usage of each concept individually, as opposed to the 
evaluative judgments reflected by the usage of that set of concepts together. For 
example, AND and THUS do not seem to be moral or social concepts. However, 
imagine someone who endorses the morally egregious thought that ‘x was dressed like 
a slut and thus x deserved to be sexually assaulted’. We have two options – we can say 
that this thinker is morally responsible for possessing and using all the concepts 
involved in having that thought, or that they are only morally responsible for some of 
them. I would prefer to say that they are likely to be responsible for them all, because if 
the situation is even fairly normal, then in using each of those concepts in that specific 
way, the subject would be guided (though probably unconsciously) by their evaluative 
judgments, so the concepts involved thereby become attributable to them. 
Reflecting on that case, one might be tempted to say that we are only morally 
responsible for concept possession and usage insofar as and because they reflect 
judgments that make morally significant evaluations. But that leads to another 
complicating factor. 
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For, third, determining which evaluations are morally significant is a complex 
and contentious project. To the extent that standards of rationality, prudence, and 
morality are enmeshed (or identical), this suggests that many of our concepts reflect 
evaluative judgments. For I can imagine rational and prudential reasons being brought 
to bear in evaluating nearly every (if not every) instance of concept possession and 
usage, and if norms of rationality, prudence, and morality are deeply enmeshed, that 
supports my intuition that many concepts are likely to reflect our evaluative judgments. 
 That said, my arguments do leave open the possibility of some concept 
possession and usage that does not reflect our evaluative judgments. For example, 
pathologically recalcitrant attitudes might involve concept usage that does not reflect a 
subject’s evaluative judgments. Similarly, science fiction examples of attitude 
implantation might involve subjects who have and use concepts that do not reflect 
their evaluative judgments. Those cases might make us think that the better approach 
for determining the likelihood that concepts reflect our evaluative judgments is to 
focus on how the concepts were acquired (option (a) above).  
That approach might also seem to be supported by cases in which someone 
intentionally seeks to acquire a new concept. Those would seem to provide 
paradigmatic cases of subjects being morally responsible for possessing concepts, 
since subjects’ intentionally seeking to acquire new concepts seems to reflect 
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evaluative judgments about the inadequacy of their existing conceptual repertoires for 
their purposes, if nothing else. But depending on the details, even mental state 
implantation cases and cases involving intentional concept acquisition might just as 
well be described as distinctive because of something about the patterned way in 
which such concepts are used after being acquired. So it is not obvious how best to 
justify the intuition that implantation cases do not reflect evaluative judgments but 
intentional acquisition cases do, and thus that we are not responsible for the former, 
but we are for the latter. 
Given those challenges (and others), I hesitate to draw any general conclusions 
about which concepts are most likely to reflect evaluative judgments, under what 
conditions they would be most likely to do so, or what proportion of concepts do so. 
Besides, those are (at least largely) empirical questions. To the extent that they are not, 
answering them requires accounting for how failures of rationality are possible, which is 
quite challenging (see Smith 2005: 255). There is certainly room for people to agree 
that we can be morally responsible for our concepts, insofar as they reflect our 
evaluative judgments, without (yet) agreeing about exactly which ones (are likely to) 
meet the relevant criteria. 
 
6. Why We Are Morally Responsible for Having and Using Concepts 
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Readers may have noted that in the main arguments of § 4, I said more about using 
concepts than having them. One might challenge me by suggesting that my arguments 
only show that we can be morally responsible for the former, not the latter. 
As I said in § 3, I think that having and using a concept are not fully separable 
phenomena. One’s having a concept is necessarily connected to (if not constituted by) 
a pattern of using (and not using) that concept (including the ability or disposition to 
do so under counterfactual conditions). This gives us reason to think that if we can be 
morally responsible for one, we can be for both. If I became convinced that I was 
wrong about the metaphysical inseparability of having a concept and using it in a 
patterned way, then I would probably concede that we are morally responsible only for 
using (or not using) concepts, not for merely having them. For I think that being morally 
responsible for a concept requires a rational connection between the concept and 
one’s evaluative judgments, and if per impossibile one has a concept yet neither uses 
nor does not use it, nor has an ability or disposition to do so under any circumstances, 
then that concept would not be rationally connected to one's evaluative judgments, 
and one would not be morally responsible (that is, in principle open to moral 
assessment) for it. 
I also gave reasons in § 4.3 for thinking that one can be morally responsible for 
having but not using a concept. The idea is that instances of non-usage are part of 
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one’s pattern of usage and can reflect one’s evaluative judgments. However, there are 
additional reasons to say that we can be morally responsible for both having and using 
(or not using) concepts. One has to do with ongoing metaphysical debates about 
concept individuation and how to determine when a person (a) has a concept that is 
somehow different from what it should be (a problematic concept) as opposed to when 
(b) they have the concept they should, but apply it in a problematic way. Similarly, 
there is debate about how to distinguish between (a’) two people having different 
concepts and (b’) their having the same concept, but using it differently.32  
If we can be morally responsible for having and using concepts, then we can say 
that when (a) is the correct diagnosis for a case, the subject is potentially worthy of 
criticism for having the concept. Whether they are potentially worthy of moral criticism 
will depend on the sense in which the concept is problematic. However, when (b) is the 
correct diagnosis, they are potentially worthy of criticism for using the concept. Of 
course, they might be worthy of criticism for both, if both types of errors obtain. 
However, we need to establish subjects’ morally responsibility before we entertain the 
separate question of whether they are blameworthy for those errors. 
 One might protest that it is unfair to say that one is morally responsible for 
merely having a concept if one could not help forming it and cannot stop having it. For 
example, one could not have been expected to know, upon picking up this paper, 
 
 
36 
that one would encounter ROO. But upon reading the paper, one probably cannot 
stop oneself from acquiring and continuing to possess that concept. One might find 
something unfair about saying that one is morally responsible for having ROO under 
such conditions. 
My response has two parts. First, this seems to confuse being morally 
responsible with being blameworthy. I do not think that questions of fairness are 
relevant to questions of whether someone is morally responsible for something. Saying 
that x is morally responsible for y is, in my view, saying that y is attributable to x in the 
way necessary for it to make sense to ask x a justificatory question about their relation 
to y. Saying that y is attributable to x is not fair or unfair, whether y is a concept, 
attitude, action, or body part. However, questions of fairness are often relevant to 
blameworthiness and whether people should express blame. Fairness is salient to 
whether the attribution of y to x is grounds for blame; it can be unfair, arrogant, and/or 
counterproductive to blame people for what they cannot control. Second, and maybe 
more importantly, the unfairness concern seems to presuppose a volitionalist account 
of moral responsibility, which I reject. Since I think we are morally responsible for 
whatever reflects our evaluative judgments, not for whatever is a direct, voluntary 
product of our wills, this unfairness objection begs the question against my view. 
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7. Objection: Eliminating Conceptual Resources 
One might object if one thinks that my view entails that we ought to remove from our 
repertoires all concepts that have derogatory content or that are necessarily connected 
to derogatory attitudes, even if that requires more than just an act of will. That could 
be seen as problematic for two different reasons.  
First, so many of our concepts are somehow connected to derogatory attitudes, 
and so many of those connections are somewhat opaque to us, that to eliminate them 
would take lots of work. Not only would we need to do the hard work of identifying 
and revising many concepts, but we would probably also need to develop many new 
concepts to compensate for those foregone resources. Committing to such wholesale 
conceptual overhaul is unappealing, given the workload involved. 
But it is an open question whether requiring substantial revisions to our 
conceptual repertoires is a problem. I think this makes my view attractive, for I tend to 
think that we have lots of room to improve in every domain of life. But to justify any 
answer to that question requires arguing for an independent principle that states how 
much conceptual revision it is appropriate to require of people, and I know of no such 
argument. 
Second, and more importantly, one might worry about my view because activists 
need to possess derogatory (and otherwise problematic) concepts, refer to them, 
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and sometimes use them in careful, strategic ways to combat injustice. For as Fricker 
shows, sometimes the lack of a concept, like SEXUAL HARASSMENT, constitutes and 
perpetuates injustice. To reduce or eliminate an unjust practice like sexual harassment, 
we need that concept and the concepts used by harassers to describe and categorize 
people as targets for harassment. So we probably need concepts with derogatory 
content, like SLUT and BITCH, for that purpose. 
Regarding that second point, I agree that we need lots of concepts to reduce 
and, I hope, eventually eliminate unjust practices. Having ROO certainly helped me 
begin to understand group-based bias and animosity, and begin developing strategies 
for resisting them. But I do not claim that we should eliminate all concepts that have 
derogatory content or are connected to derogatory attitudes. Neither the fact that we 
can be morally responsible for our concepts, nor the fact that we can be morally 
blameworthy for having and using (or not using) morally problematic concepts entails 
that we should eliminate rather than revise any given problematic concept. 
In fact, my view entails that we have reason to keep revised versions of 
derogatory concepts in our repertoires as long as related injustices and other problems 
exist (or are likely to) and so need to be resisted (or prevented). There is no 
inconsistency in saying this, for, like Smith, I want to keep the claim that a person is 
morally responsible for an action, an attitude, or (in my case) a concept separate 
 
 
39 
from claims about whether that person is blameworthy or praiseworthy for it (or 
neither). As Smith says: 
[T]he rational relations view is an account of the conditions of responsibility in 
the sense of moral attributability, that is, the conditions under which something 
can be attributed to a person in the way that is required in order for it to be a 
basis for moral appraisal of that person. Merely claiming that a person is 
responsible for something, therefore, does not by itself settle the question of 
what appraisal, if any, should be made of the person on the basis of it. (2005: 
266) 
This is crucial. For determining that someone is morally responsible for a concept is just 
the first step toward determining whether they thereby merit praise, blame, or neither. 
When morally assessing someone for one of their concepts, we must respond to 
numerous factors specific to the person and context to determine whether having and 
using (or not using) that concept reflects on them positively, negatively, or neither (see 
Smith 2007: § 4). 
I am inclined to think that nearly everyone who possesses a certain concept is 
morally responsible for that, but that some are morally blameworthy and others 
praiseworthy or neutral for how they use (or do not use) that same concept. So adults 
who use ROO to distance themselves from people who meditate, thereby 
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conceptualizing such people as inferior, are, I submit, both morally responsible and 
probably somewhat blameworthy for doing so. Similarly, upon acquiring ROO, I 
became morally responsible for having it. However, since I always (a) understood that 
the concept was created and used to unfairly denigrate all members of a group, (b) 
avoided using it to structure my thinking, (c) refused to use the term ‘roo’ to refer to 
people, and (d) tried to articulate disapproval of those who did, I do not think that my 
possessing ROO made me blameworthy. However, I probably did not merit praise; my 
possessing ROO was probably morally neutral, though whether that is so depends on 
various factors, some of which I am poorly positioned to assess. Anyone who 
possessed it but did not make any relevant evaluative judgments (if that is possible) 
would not have been responsible for possessing or using it, and thus certainly not 
blameworthy. 
Furthermore, our needing a concept for present purposes implies nothing about 
whether we always will. I needed ROO as a child to understand and cope with the local 
social landscape, but things change. I certainly did not need it in the same way once I 
moved away, and I have heard that the social division in my hometown has diminished. 
It may be that no one uses that concept anymore (though I have heard that some 
people who meditate have reclaimed ‘roo’ and now self-identify as roos). Maybe no 
one needs that concept to understand and struggle against the idiosyncratic social 
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division that I grew up with, because maybe the problem has been resolved, changed, 
or will be soon. If so, I would be delighted. 
 
8. Objection: Disanalogy between Attitudes and Concepts 
Someone might object to my claim that concepts are reasons-responsive by noting one 
way that attitudes and concepts differ. One might say that attitudes are reasons-
responsive if and only if they can and should disappear once we alter the judgments on 
which they depend. So, for instance, my hope for victory can and should be eliminated 
once I decide that defeat is inevitable, because defeat’s inevitability is inconsistent with 
victory’s possibility, and hope requires believing in the latter.  
However, one might say, concepts are not like that: despite someone’s coming 
to believe that ROO is not appropriately applied to anyone, that person likely will, and 
maybe should, retain that concept. Since concepts do not and should not necessarily 
disappear, unlike the hope described above, one might say that concepts are not 
linked to judgments as attitudes are, and thus are not reasons-responsive. 
However, this objection relies on an overly narrow account of reasons-
responsiveness. Utterly eliminating an attitude from one’s mind is only one way to 
respond to reasons; there are many other ways that involve changing, but not 
eliminating, mental states. For instance, hope is reasons-responsive even if, in light 
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of a judgment about defeat’s inevitability, one does not eliminate it, but merely 
reduces its intensity or changes its object (say, from winning to doing one’s best). 
While such a person might have conflicting attitudes, and thus not be perfectly 
reasons-responsive, that does not mean that nothing reasons-responsive is going on. 
Furthermore, attitudes and concepts can both be reasons-responsive without 
being reasons-responsive in exactly the same way. For one thing, they are structurally 
different; concepts are used in having attitudes, so in one sense, attitudes are 
structurally more complex than concepts. Many attitudes, for instance, are 
propositional and purport to describe the world, so they are responsive to reasons for 
thinking that they do so correctly (or not). The possibility of attitudes describing things 
incorrectly is why their elimination is often the response one has most reason to make. 
But isolated concepts are not propositional and thus do not purport to describe the 
world (though they can be used as tools in attempts to do so). Therefore, the kinds of 
reasons that concepts respond to are somewhat different from those that attitudes 
respond to. Hence, we use different criteria to make judgments about them and tend 
to describe attitudes as correct or fitting, but concepts as apt or useful. So, I can accept 
and, to some extent, explain the proposed disanalogy between concepts and attitudes 
while maintaining that both are (somewhat, somehow) reasons-responsive. 
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9. Conclusion 
Assuming that concepts are mental representations, and building on Angela Smith’s 
rational relations account of the criteria for moral responsibility, I have argued that 
because concepts are like attitudes in three key respects relating to rational activity, we 
are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts in 
the ways that we do, despite the fact that such things are not under our full or direct 
voluntary control. For having and using (or having but not using) concepts can involve 
taking a stand about how we ought to think about things and what matters.33 Since it 
makes sense to ask us to defend such a stand, we should be prepared to do so. 
Concept possession and usage (or non-usage) invite such justificatory questions in ways 
that, for instance, kidney possession and usage do not, because concepts can reflect 
evaluative judgments and kidneys cannot. 
If I am correct, there is plenty more to discuss regarding our moral responsibility 
for concepts; I particularly look forward to thinking more about collective moral 
responsibility for concepts, given the social factors that influence concept acquisition.34 
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1 I am concerned with moral responsibility throughout; I do not argue that we are 
epistemically responsible for our concepts, though I suspect we are, given that we are 
epistemically responsible for our beliefs and concepts are used in having beliefs. 
2 By ‘revising a concept’, I intend to encompass adjustments to its content and to the 
ways in which we use it (or do not). 
3 See Hieronymi (2008). 
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4 Perhaps concept usage is only under our direct control when we choose to entertain a 
thought. 
5 I think that in many such cases, people lack blameworthiness, not moral responsibility. 
6 See Isaacs (2011: 79); Kane (1998); Levy (2005: 2–16); Sidgwick (1981: 60–61); Taylor 
(1970: 241–252); and Wallace (1996: 131–132) for volitionalist views. 
7 For rationalist views, see Scanlon (1998) and Arpaly (2006). I appreciate how such 
views make epistemic and moral responsibility more clearly continuous; Hieronymi 
(2008) highlights this particularly well.  
8 Two other benefits of Smith’s view are its ability to (i) account for the moral self’s 
boundaries and (ii) explain why intuitions that seem to support volitionalism are 
common. See Smith (2005: 263). 
9 On the supposed shallowness of real self views like Smith’s, see Wolf (1990); 
McKenna (2008); and Smith (2008). 
10 See Thagard (1990) for more roles that concepts play in our thinking. 
11 One might ask whether saying that TRIANGLE is conceptually connected to ANGLE 
entails that one must possess the latter to possess the former. For it seems that 
children might identify, intentionally draw, and talk about triangles without having 
ANGLE. That seems right, but those children would not have the same conception of a 
triangle as I do (see Davis 2005a and 2005b on the difference between concept 
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possession and mastery, and the difference between concepts and conceptions). We 
are both morally responsible for our concepts, but her youth makes her more likely to 
have an excuse if hers is problematic. For present purposes, I need not be able to 
identify when a specific person possesses a specific concept, since I only want to show 
that when someone does have and use a concept, it can be attributable to her in a way 
that makes her open to moral appraisal on that basis. I lack space to explain or 
adjudicate debates about how to understand possession conditions of concepts, how 
to differentiate concepts, or what count as mistaken applications of concepts, but see 
also Nordby (2004), Siebel (2011), and Verdejo and de Donato Rodríguez (2015).  
12 See Haslanger (2012: 375, 378, and 387–390) on the distinction between manifest 
and operative concepts. 
13 For relevant discussion of terms that are and are not (implicitly or explicitly) 
normatively laden, see Barnes (2016: 173–176). 
14 You could ask me to defend my judging that the opinion is unjust, but that reframes 
the same request, since that judging simply is a particular way of using INJUSTICE. 
15 I cannot capture all the subtleties of Smith’s view here, nor the full significance of ‘in 
principle’ in this quote. For Smith (2004) recognizes that attitudes can be recalcitrant, 
especially when we hold conflicting attitudes.  
 
 
50 
                                                                                                                                             
16 The following discussion of rational revision raises questions, which I cannot answer 
here, about what is being revised. Some say it is concepts, but others say conceptions. 
On the distinction, see Siebel (2011). Some say conceptual content is being revised, 
but others say it is conceptual structure or functional or inferential role.  
17 Have I revised my concept of RACE or chosen between two different concepts that 
are available for my use? I leave that question unresolved, since both are reasons-
responsive processes. I also set aside a ship of Theseus-like problem about conceptual 
identity and change. 
18 This rarely prevents me from understanding people using a biological concept of 
race, since I can remember or discover changes in my conceptual repertoire in 
hindsight, which enables such understanding. Revising my concept does, however, 
rationally commit me to judging (when appropriately prompted) that there is 
something problematic about my ‘earlier draft’ of the concept. On partial 
understanding and concept possession, see Nordby (2004) and Verdejo and de 
Donato Rodríguez (2015). 
19 I do not think there is a bright line between those two kinds of conceptual change. 
For example, one’s concept of marriage might have changed both because of 
changing (legal) reality and also because of new ways of understanding unchanged 
aspects of reality (like love, commitment, and justice). 
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20 See also Barnes (2016: 44) on the social construction of DISABILITY, which implies a 
similar process.  
21 Moreover, if ought implies can, then insofar as we are generally unable to eliminate 
concepts from our repertoires, continuing to possess even morally problematic 
concepts can be morally permissible. 
22 See this paper’s epigraph, where Haslanger asks whether we should retain our 
concepts, allowing for a moral interpretation of ‘should’. 
23 Some might object to my treating slurs as expressions of distinct concepts, preferring 
to treat them as expressions of non-slurring concepts coupled with derogatory 
attitudes like disgust or contempt, and locating the problem in the attitudes. I do think 
of slurring concepts as distinct, with problematic content built in (see Camp 2013), but 
even if I am wrong to do so, elsewhere I aim to show that the kinds of criticisms that I 
level against slurring concepts also apply to some commonly used non-slurring 
concepts that appear to be purely descriptive and morally unproblematic. 
24 This raises questions, which I briefly discuss in § 7, about the possibility and 
desirability of rehabilitating or reclaiming (rather than eliminating) concepts like 
QUEER, BITCH, etc. (and associated terms) that have been linked to morally 
problematic attitudes and practices. 
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25 This might make sense in some unusual cases, just as we might not be responsible 
for concepts in some unusual cases. However, shooters will virtually always be at least 
partially responsible for having the guns they use, even if others share that 
responsibility.  
26 A similar idea apparently animated Charles Mills when he wrote: 
concepts are crucial to cognition: cognitive scientists point out that they help us 
to categorize, learn, remember, infer, explain, problem-solve, generalize, 
analogize. Correspondingly, the lack of appropriate concepts can hinder 
learning, interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct explanation, and 
perpetuate problems. I am suggesting, then, that as a central concept the 
notion of a Racial Contract might be more revealing of the real character of the 
world we are living in, and the corresponding historical deficiencies of its 
normative theories and practices, than the raceless notions currently dominant in 
political theory. (1997: 6-7) 
Relatedly, for discussion of an overlooked type of biases encoded in the dependency 
networks of our conceptual representations, see Del Pinal and Spaulding (2018). See 
also Camp (2013). 
27 Those two concepts may or may not be coextensive, but they certainly represent the 
items in their extension differently. 
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28 Of course, in practice, it will often be hard to tell whether the (main) moral problem is 
the concept(s), attitude(s), behavior(s), or some precise combination of those. 
29 On the epistemic and moral significance of lacking concepts and disagreement 
about the primary harm of such a lack, see Fricker (2007) and Dotson (2012). If I am 
correct, we have a moral responsibility not only to revise or eliminate problematic 
concepts, but also to acquire liberatory and otherwise worthwhile concepts. 
30 Here ‘rational agent’ means one capable of rational activity, not one who is always 
perfectly rational. 
31 Volitionalists could support my conclusion by arguing that having and using concepts 
involves choice or another exercise of will. 
32 See, for example, Duhau Girola (2012). 
33 See the Brandom quote in footnote 18 of McCullagh (2011). 
34 Many thanks to Ben Almassi, Zac Cogley, Jeremy Fischer, Angela Smith, my 
colleagues at Ball State, anonymous reviewers at multiple journals, and audiences at 
WOGAP, the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, and the APA Eastern for insightful 
comments. 
